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Abstract 
In this paper, theauthorpresentsan over- 
view of the evolution of gender-related 
issues in thedetermination of refugees in 
Canada. The question of whethera state 
can adequately protect a woman from 
gender-related persecution emergesfrom 
her analysis and places feasibility study 
at the apogee of directions for research. 
Duns cet article, l'auteur prksente un 
apercu de l'&lution des questions rela- 
tives au sexagedans la dktemzination des 
dktenteurs de statut de rkfigik au Ca- 
nada. Laquestiondesavoirsiunktat pact 
protkger adkquatement une femme des 
perskcutionsfondkes sur le sexage h g e  
de l'analyseetplace les ktudes de faisabi- 
lit6 au faite des directions de rechercheh 
envisager. 
Since the mid-1980s, refugeedetermina- 
tion for women refugee claimants who 
fear gender-related persecution has 
been evolving and progressing in the 
international arena. The issues sur- 
rounding gender-related persecution 
have been discussed, modified, en- 
hanced and more clearly articulated 
such that today there is a far greater 
understanding of the issues and abetter 
appreciation of the legal analysis which 
is required for these types of refugee 
claims. At the Immigration and Refugee 
Board of Canada (IRB), there has been a 
similar evolution and progression in the 
issues to be resolved. 
A female refugee claimant must sat- 
isfy the definition of the Convention 
refugee1 which provides as follows: 
"Convention refugee" means any 
person who by reason of a well- 
founded fear of persecution for rea- 
sons of race, religion, nationality, 
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membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion is outside 
the country of the person's national- 
ity, or country of former habitual 
residence, and is unable or, by reason 
of that fear, is unwilling to avail him- 
self of the protection of that country. 
A workable analytical framework 
which can be used to make an assess- 
ment of whether a woman refugeeclaim- 
ant satisfies this definitionis as follows: 
Is the harm which she fears "perse- 
cution", that is, a serious violation of 
a fundamental human right? 
If the harm is persecution, then is the 
persecution going to occur by reason 
of her race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular- social 
group or political opinion? 
If yes, then is the fear of persecution 
well founded and, in particular, is 
there state protection available to 
her? 
Since the IRB started in 1989, there 
has been a systematic progression of the 
issues surrounding claims of women. 
At the outset, some claims of gender- 
related persecution would not make it 
past the first part of the analytical frame- 
work outlined above whereas today 
many claims seem to be resolved at the 
third and final stage of the framework. 
Initially, there was some doubt as to 
whether gender-specific forms of perse- 
cution would fit within the concept of 
persecution in the Convention refugee 
definition. As stated in the Canadian 
Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 
The circumstances, which give rise to 
women's fear of persecution are of- 
ten unique to women. The existing 
bank of jurisprudence on the mean- 
ing of persecution is based on, for the 
most part, the experiences of male 
claimants. Aside from a few cases of 
rape, the definition has not been 
widely applied to female-specific ex- 
periences, such as infanticide, genital 
mutilation, bride-burning, forced 
marriage, domestic violence, forced 
abortion, or compulsory steriliza- 
tion. 
Generally, gender-specific forms of 
human rights violations have been 
found by the Immigration and Refugee 
Board2 and by the Federal Court of 
Canada3 to amount to persecution. 
Thus, the first part of the analytical 
framework should no longer be consid- 
ered a contentious legal issue in the 
Canadian context. 
The second part of the frameworkhas 
also evolve din the last few years. As can 
be seen from the Convention refugee 
definition itself, persecution by reason 
of "gender" is not explicitly mentioned. 
However, following the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision in Ward: the ground 
of "membership in a particular social 
group" proved to be broad enough to 
cover "women". Thus, a woman who 
fears gender-related persecution can 
argue that this is by reason of her gender. 
Since the Ward decision, there has been 
some debate as to whether the group 
should be broadly defined as "womenn5 
or whether a more particular group, 
such as "women subject to domestic 
abuseF6 is more appropriate. The posi- 
tive progression is that, rather than 
challenging the existence of a group, the 
challenge has been to properly articu- 
late the group. 
As a result of a resolution of the sec- 
ond part of the analytical framework, 
the final part of the analysis is being 
reached more often in gender-related 
claims and many claims of gender-re- 
lated persecution seem to comedown to 
an assessment of whether there is state 
protection available. The analysis in- 
volves an assessment of four questions: 
1) What has the state done, or not done, 
for the woman in the past? 
2) What has the state done, or not done, 
for similarly situated women in the 
past? 
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3) What is the state willing or able to do 
about the persecution if the woman 
refugee claimant were to return to 
her country? 
4) Is this adequate protection from the 
harm feared? 
From these questions arises a legal 
question for resolution: what level of 
state protection is required to say that 
state protection is available and the fear 
of persecution is not well-founded. In 
the Canadian context, this seems to 
have been resolved by the Federalcourt 
to be adequate but not perfect protec- 
tion.' 
In conclusion, it is always instructive 
to review the evolution of the law and to 
see how areas of legal contention are 
resolved. In the case of gender-related 
persecution, the analysis in Canada 
seems to havenow evolved to the point 
where the central issue is-can a state 
adequately protect a woman from gen- 
der-related persecution? 
Notes 
1. Section 2(1) of the Immigration Act,= en- 
acted by R.S.C. 1985(4th Supp.), c. 28, s.1. 
The full definition is: 
"Convention refugee" means any person 
who: 
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of perse- 
cution for reasonsof race, religion, nation- 
ality, membership in a particular social 
group or political opinion, 
(i) is outside the country of the person's na- 
tionality and is unable or, by reason of that 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country, or 
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is out- 
side the country of the person's former 
habitual residenceand is unable or, by rea- 
son of that fear, is unwilling to return to 
that country, and 
(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee 
by virtue of subsection (2), 
but does not include any person to whom 
theconvention doesnot apply pursuant to 
section E or F of Article 1 thereof, which 
sections are set out in the schedule to this 
Act. 
2. For female genital mutiliation, see M95- 
13161, Didier, Prevost, March 13, 1997 
(reasons signed March20,1997), and T93- 
12198, Ramirez, McCaffrey, May 10,1994. 
For forced sterilization, see V94-01287, 
Sachedina, Daggett, February 20, 1997. 
For forced marriage, see A96-00154, 
Showler, Gaboury (dissenting), June 11, 
1997. 
3. For femalegenitalmutiliation, see Annanv. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immi- 
gration), [I9951 3 F.C. 25 (T.D.). For forced 
sterilization,seeCheungv. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration), [I9931 2 
F.C. 314 (C.A.). For forced marriage, see 
Vidhani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration), [I9951 3 F.C. 60 (T.D.). 
For domestic violence, see Narvaez v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immi- 
gration), [I9951 2 F.C. 55 (T.D.). 
4. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [I9931 2 
S.C.R. 689 
5. For examples of women being found to be 
the particular social group, see U93- 
09915, Silcoff, Naqvi, August 9, 1994, 
V94-01548 Whitehead, Kalvin, May 15, 
1995 (reasons signed March 24,1997 and 
March 26,1997), and T93-12198, Ramirez, 
McCaffrey, May 10,1994. 
6. For examples of narrower group articula- 
tion, see T93-04176 et al., Desai, 
Koulouras (dissenting), December 7,1993, 
U95-04292, Allmen, Daya, October 2, 
1996, and V94-01287, Sachedina, 
Daggett, February 20,1997. In the Federal 
Court of Canada, Narvaez v. Canada (Min- 
ister of Citizenship and Immigration), [I9951 
2 F.C. 55 (T.D.), Diluna v. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration) (1995), 29 
Imm. L.R. (2d) 156 (F.C.T.D.) , Litvinov, 
Svetlanav. S.S.C. (F.C.T.D.,no. IMM-7488- 
93), Gibson, June 30, 1994. 
7 .  Zalzuli v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605 
(F.C.A.); (1991), 14 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81 and 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immi- 
gration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imrn. L.R. 
(2d) 130 (F.C.A.). a 
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